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Bartel: Rape Shield Statutes

A COMPARISON OF TBIE FEDERAL AND NEW
YORK STATE RAPE SHIELD STATUTES
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Good afternoon. Welcome back to this symposium on
comparing New York and Federal Evidence law, or, if you were
not here this morning, welcome initially. We are proceeding this
afternoon with, first, Professor Deborah Stavile Bartel, who will
talk about Rape Shield Laws, followed by Professor Barry
Scheck on expert testimony, particularly the Daubert case in the
Supreme Court and the influence that has had, and finally,
Professor Gary Shaw on hypnotically-refreshed testimony. That
will, in part, leave us with a little more time at the end for freefor-all questions or comments from the audience, so arm yourself
with any interesting problems that may occur to you that our
panelists may be able to deal with. So, we will proceed with
Professor Bartel.
ProfessorDeborah Stavile Bartel*:
INTRODUCTION

Thank you, Judge Pratt. I am going to talk this afternoon about
the differences between the rape shield statutes of the Federal
2
Rules of Evidence 1 and New York Criminal Procedure Laws.
* Professor Deborah Stavile Bartel is a Visiting Associate Professor at
Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law School. She is a former Assistant
U.S. Attorney, S.D.N.Y.

1. The federal rape shield statute is embodied in Federal Rule of
Evidence 412. Rule 412 states:

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in
which a person is accused of an offense under chapter 109A of title 18,
United States Code, reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual
behavior of an alleged victim of such offense is not admissible.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in
which a person is accused of an offense under chapter 109A of title 18,
United States Code, evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior other
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than reputation or opinion evidence is also not admissible, unless such
evidence other than reputation or opinion evidence is-(1) admitted in accordance with subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(2) and is
constitutionally required to be admitted; or
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of-(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused,
offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the accused
was or was not, with respect to the alleged victim, the source
of semen or injury; or
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by the
accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim
consented to the sexual behavior with respect to which such
offense is alleged.
(c)(1) If the person accused of committing an offense under chapter
109A of title 18, United States Code intends to offer under
subdivision (b) evidence of specific instances of the alleged
victim's past sexual behavior, the accused shall make a written
motion to offer such evidence not later than fifteen days before the
date on which the trial in which such evidence is to be offered is
scheduled to begin, except that the court may allow the motion to
be made at a later date, including during trial, if the court
determines either that the evidence is newly discovered and could
not have been obtained earlier through the exercise of due
diligence or that the issue to which such evidence relates has newly
arisen in the case. Any motion made under this paragraph shall be
served on all other parties and on the alleged victim.
(2) The motion described in paragraph (1) shall be accompanied by a
written offer of proof. If the court determines that the offer of
proof contains evidence described in subdivision (b), the court
shall order a hearing in chambers to determine if such evidence is
admissible. At such hearing the parties may call witnesses,
including the alleged victim, and offer relevant evidence.
Notwithstanding subdivision (b) of rule 104, if the relevancy of the
evidence which the accused seeks to offer in the trial depends upon
the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court, at the hearing in
chambers or at a subsequent hearing in chambers scheduled for
such purpose, shall accept evidence on the issue of whether such
condition of fact is fulfilled and shall determine such issue.
(3) If the court determines on the basis of the hearing described in
paragraph (2) that the evidence which the accused seeks to offer is
relevant and that the probative value of such evidence outweighs
the danger of unfair prejudice, such evidence shall be admissible in
the trial to the extent an order made by the court specifies evidence
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Before I begin to discuss these statutes, which are only about
twenty years old, I would like to talk for a moment about what
the law had previously been.
You may remember that Professor Jim Kainen spoke this
morning about the admissibility in certain instances of a victim's
character-- if relevant. 3 Before the enactment of Rape Shield
Laws, which are exclusionary rules by and large, a victim's
character for unchastity was thought to be relevant to the question
of whether she consented to the act of sexual intercourse or
sodomy, as the case might be, on a particular occasion. 4 So,
which may be offered and areas with respect to which the alleged
victim may be examined or cross-examined.
(d) For purposes of this rule, the term "past sexual behavior" means
sexual behavior other than the sexual behavior with respect to which an
offense under chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code is alleged.
FED. R. EVID. 412.
2. The New York rape shield statute is embodied in New York Criminal
Procedure Law section 60.42. Section 60.42 provides:
Evidence of a victim's sexual conduct shall not be admissible in a
prosecution for an offense or an attempt to commit an offense defined in
article one hundred thirty of the penal law unless such evidence:
1. proves or tends to prove specific instances of the victim's prior
sexual conduct with the accused; or
2. proves or tends to prove that the victim has been convicted of an
offense under Section 230.00 of the penal law within three years
prior to the sex offense which is the subject of the prosecution; or
3. rebuts evidence introduced by the people of the victim's failure to
engage in sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or sexual
contact during a given period of time; or
4. rebuts evidence introduced by the people which proves or tends to
prove that the accused is the cause of pregnancy or disease of the
victim, or the source of semen found in the victim; or
5. is determined by the court after an offer of proof by the accused
outside the hearing of the jury, or such hearing as the court may
require, and a statement by the court of its findings of fact
essential to its determination, to be relevant and admissible in the
interests of justice.
N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1992).
3. See James L. Kainen, CharacterEvidence, 11 TOURO L. REV.
-(1994).
4. See Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulaion: Rape Cases in
the Courtroom, 77 COLUtM. L. REv. 1, 15 (1977). This article discussed, in
-2
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before these laws, it was fair game to question any complainant
in a rape case as to her prior sexual history. 5 I am going to use
the feminine pronoun to refer to victims of rape because the vast
majority of the reported cases in the federal and New York State
courts' appellate decisions involve women victims; there were,
however, plenty of boy victims in cases involving the sexual
assault of minors. Additionally, I will use the masculine pronoun
to refer to defendants because most, not all, persons accused of
sexual assault are men.
Because lengthy cross-examination with respect to
complainants' prior acts of unchastity or sexual conduct was the
norm, complainants seldom brought rape charges. 6 Rape was one
of the least reported violent crimes in the country. 7 Crossexamination into, or independent evidence of, the complainant's
prior sexual conduct was also thought to unnecessarily harass the
victim, embarrass the victim, and confuse the jury. Allowing
such cross-examination or other evidence worked against the fair
administration of justice. The jury was given information which
may have been completely irrelevant to the issue of the
complainant's consent on any particular occasion, but it may have
used that information about the alleged victim's prior unchastity
part, how the victim's unchastity was relevant to whether she consented to an
act which led to rape charges. "'The underlying thought here is that it is more
probable that an unchaste woman would assent ...

than a virtuous woman.'"

Id. (quoting People v. Collins, 186 N.E.2d 30, 33 (Ill. 1962)).
5. Id.

6. See 124 CONG. REC. H34913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman).
Too often in this country victims of rape are humiliated and harassed
when they report and prosecute the rape. Bullied and cross-examined
about their prior sexual experiences, many find the trial almost as
degrading as the rape itself. Since rape trials become inquisitions into
the victim's morality, not trials of the defendant's innocence or guilt, it
is not surprising that it is the least reported crime. It is estimated that as
few as one in ten rapes is ever reported.
Id.
7. See Ronet Bachman, Ph.D. & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary
Look at the Effects of Rape Law Reform: How FarHave We Really Come?, 84
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554, 565-66 (1993) (stating that there has been a
10% to 13% increase in reported rapes from the years 1980 to 1990 due in

part to rape reform legislation).
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or promiscuity against her. 8 Thus, defendants who may have
been responsible for violent acts of rape were acquitted because
of prejudice against sexually active women. To address these
problems, all but two state jurisdictions have now enacted
exclusionary rules prohibiting the admissibility of such evidence
except in exceptional circumstances. 9
I. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 412
Let us take a look, first, at Federal Rule of Evidence 412, the
federal Rape Shield Law. This law, adopted in 1978, was mostly
intended as a model statute. Actually, there are not that many
times when the federal courts have jurisdiction over the crime of
rape. The rape would have to occur some place like an Indian
reservation or in a federal courthouse or on Amtrack. It has to
occur someplace where the federal authorities have jurisdiction.
How does the federal rape shield law work? Federal Rule of
Evidence 412(a) bans all evidence of the complainant's
reputation; it also bans all opinion evidence as to her chastity. 10
Federal Rule of Evidence 412(b) admits specific acts of a
victim's prior sexual conduct in three limited circumstances:
first, (b)(1) admits such acts whenever the constitution requires
11
the admission of the complainant's prior sexual conduct;
second, (b)(2)(A) permits the complainant's prior sexual conduct
with persons other than the accused to be admissible for two
8. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Richard A.

Wayman, Lucas Comes to Visit Iowa: Balancing Interests Under Iowa 's RapeShield EvidentiaryRule, 77 IOWA L. REv. 865 (1992). A jury could infer from
a victim's unchastity that she probably consented to have sexual intercourse.
Id. at 870. "A woman's unchaste character was viewed as a badge of her
credibility since promiscuity implied dishonesty, and the testimony of a woman
who had poisonously tainted her body with sexual impropriety was given less
weight." Id.
9. Arizona and Utah are the two states without rape shield laws. David
Comment, Rape Shield Statutes: Constitutional Despite
Haxton,
Unconstitutional Exclusions of Evidence, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1219, 1219 n.2
(1985).
10. FED. R. EVID. 412(a).
11. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1).
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limited purposes, so that the defendant can disclaim being the
source of semen on the occasion in question, and disclaim
12
responsibility as the source of injury caused to the complainant;
and third, (b)(2)(B) allows evidence of the complainant's prior
sexual conduct with the defendant only so long as it bears
relevancy to the issue of her consent, or on the reasonableness of
his belief that she has consented. 13 So, those are the limited
instances when the federal rules would admit evidence of the
prior sexual conduct of a complainant in a rape case.
If evidence is admissible, nonetheless, Federal Rule of
Evidence 412(c) imposes very strict notice and hearing
requirements. 14 A defendant who wishes to offer any such
evidence must make a written motion at least fifteen days before
the trial begins, explaining his offer of proof in writing and why
it comes within one of the 412(b) exceptions. 15 He must serve
this motion on all of the parties to the action 1 6 including: the
government, and any codefendants. He must also serve the
motion papers on the victim.
Rule 412(c) then requires the court to hold a hearing, 17 after
which the court must make a determination whether the evidence
is within one of the 412(b) exceptions and whether its probative
value outweighs its prejudicial effect. 18 If the court determines
the evidence of the victim's prior sexual history to be admissible,
the court must then issue an order, outlining specifically what is
admissible and the areas of cross-examination for the
complainant. 19 Federal Rule of Evidence 412 has been construed
to confer standing on a victim to appeal an adverse ruling.
Consequently, if evidence is ruled admissible about the victim's

12. FED. R. EvID. 412(b)(2)(A).
13. FED. R. EvID. 412(b)(2)(B).
14. FED. R. EvID. 412(c).
15. FED. R. EvID. 412(c)(1).
16. Id.
17. FED. R. EvID. 412(c)(2).
18. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(3). This balancing test is different than the one
imposed under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
19. Id.
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prior sexual conduct, the victim herself has the right to take an
appeal. 20

Now, as an exclusionary rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 412
obviously touches on the defendant's Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause rights, 2 1 right to compulsory process of
evidence in his behalf, 22 right to testify in his own behalf,23 and
may implicate the due process right to a fair trial. 24 These
implications do not render the statute unconstitutional. 25 The
Supreme Court has upheld restrictions on a defendant's right to

20. See Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981). The court in
Doe held that the victim was allowed to appeal the ruling by the trial judge, in
a pre-trial hearing, which would have permitted evidence of the victim's
reputation, habit, and sexual conduct. Id. "The rule makes no reference to the
right of a victim to appeal an adverse ruling. Nevertheless, this remedy is
implicit as a necessary corollary of the rule's explicit protection of the privacy
interests Congress sought to safeguard." Id. at 46.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him." Id.
22. U.S. CONrST. amend. VI. The Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth
Amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy... compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor." Id.
23. A defendant's right to testify in his or her own behalf is found in the
Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 5152 (1987). "The opportunity to testify is... a necessary corollary to the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony." Id. at 52 "The right to
testify is also found in the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, which grants a defendant the right to call 'witnesses in his favor,'
a right that is guaranteed in the criminal courts of the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967))
"The necessary ingredients of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no
one shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law include a right to be
heard and to offer testimony. . . ." Id. at 51.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person.., shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " Id.
25. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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cross-examine, 2 6 right to offer substantive testimony, 2 7 and has
upheld notice requirements. 2 8 The Court has not invalidated a
statute where the defendant could be precluded from offering
evidence relevant for his failure to comply with notice
requirements. 2 9 The Court held, in Michigan v. Lucas,3 0 that
Rape Shield Laws are not per se unconstitutional because of such

requirements. 3 1 The court must examine the statute's application
26. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986). "Trial judges
retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose
reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among
other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness'
safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Id. at
679; see also Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (holding that the
Confrontation Clause provides a criminal defendant with "an opportunity for
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever
way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish").
27. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (holding that relevant
testimony may be precluded); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973). "In the exercise of [the right to present witnesses in one's own
defense], the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with established
rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability
in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence." Id. at 302. As well, a criminal's
right to cross-examine "may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other
legitimate interests in the criminal trial process." Id. at 295.
28. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973) (stating that notice
requirements are "a salutary development which, by increasing the evidence
available to both parties, enhances the fairness of the adversary system"); see
also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (holding that a criminal
defendant is required to notify the State of any alibi witnesses that he intends to
call at trial). But see Rock, 483 U.S. at 56 (holding that restrictions on notice
requirements "may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they
are designed to serve").
29. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151 (1991). See United States v.
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) (precluding an investigator from testifying on
behalf of the defense because the defendant failed to provide a copy of the
investigator's report to the prosecution).
30. 500 U.S. 145 (1991).
31. Id. at 153. The Court stated that adopting a per se rule holding
unconstitutional all rape shield statutes that permit the preclusion of evidence
of prior sexual relations between the victim and the defendant, when the
defendant fails to comply with the notice and hearing requirements of the
statute, was erroneous. Id. at 152-53.
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in every instance, because of such requirements, to determine
whether the preclusion of substantive evidence or the preclusion
for failure to comply with the notice requirements in a particular
case violated one of the defendant's constitutional rights. 32
Defendants have no constitutional right to present irrelevant
evidence, and Rule 412 adopts a policy that evidence of a
victim's prior lack of chastity, or promiscuity, is irrelevant to the
issue of whether she consented to sexual intercourse on the
particular occasion in question. 33
Not only does the defendant have no constitutional right to
offer irrelevant evidence, the Supreme Court further recognizes
that there may be legitimate restrictions placed on a defendant's
right to offer even relevant evidence. A defendant has no right to
offer relevant evidence free from the restrictions, the legitimate
restrictions, of the adversarial process. A defendant cannot avoid
the reasonable notice and written motion requirements of a
statute. 34 Whether or not preclusion is an appropriate sanction
for defense failure to comply with reasonable notice and written
motion requirements depends on whether preclusion of the
defendant's evidence is arbitrary or disproportionate to the
legitimate interests which the Rape Shield Law is designed to
serve: namely, to avoid unnecessary harassment of the victim; to
avoid surprise to the prosecution where the prosecution cannot
investigate claims of prior sexual conduct to refute them; and to
eliminate irrelevant evidence which would confuse the jury. 35
32. Michigan v. Lucas, 484 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)

("[A] determination whether the notice requirement violated a defendant's
right of confrontation must be made case by case." (citing Lucas, 500 U.S. at
149)).
33. United States v. Duncan, 855 F.2d 1528, 1533 (1 th Cir. 1988) ("Rule
412 was premised on the precept that an accused does not have a constitutional

right to present irrelevant evidence, and 'reputation and opinion concerning a
victim's past sexual behavior are not relevant indicators of the likelihood of her

consent to a specific sexual act or of her veracity.'" (quoting Doe v. United
States, 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981))), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1029 (1989)
34. FED. R. EvID. 412(c).
35. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 152-53 ("The notice-and-hearing requirement

serves legitimate state interests in protecting against surprise, harassment, and
undue delay.").
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There is another instance when preclusion has been upheld by
the Supreme Court, even if it is a disproportionate remedy where the defendant's violation of the discovery rules, such as
the notice requirement, is willful or designed to gain a tactical
advantage. 36 In such instance, the Court has also suggested that
preclusion may be an appropriate remedy even if a less harsh
remedy, a less harsh penalty, would advance the government's
interest. 37 In sum, whether or not the Due Process Clause or the
Confrontation Clause is implicated depends on a case-by-case
fact-specific analysis of what was offered by the defense or the
weight of the reasons why the defendant failed to comply with
the notice or other procedural requirements.
Now, let us look at the different provisions of Rule 412 in
sequence. Federal Rule of Evidence 412(a) bans all reputation
and opinion evidence as to a complainant's prior lack of
chastity. 38 I have to question whether or not an absolute ban on
reputation and opinion evidence is constitutional. Sometimes the
ban may not infringe upon constitutional guarantees of the
defendant, but sometimes it may. For example, reputation or
opinion evidence may be the best evidence available to a
particular defendant to prove one of the exceptions under the
statute -- one exception that the statute recognizes and authorizes
is the admission of evidence of the complainant's past sexual
history with the defendant or others. So, for example, the
defendant may wish to offer evidence of the complainant's prior
sexual conduct with another to explain the source of semen or
injury to the complainant, and yet the person whom he wishes to
call, who has personal knowledge, may be unavailable, may be
out of the jurisdiction, or may be deceased. It may be that the
36. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417 (1988) (precluding the
calling of a witness when defendant interviewed the witness the week before
the trial began and amended his Answer, but failed to give notice of the
witness to the prosecution).
37. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 152-53. The Court reasoned that preclusion would
be appropriate because a "less severe penalty 'would perpetuate rather than
limit the prejudice to the State and the harm to the adversary process."' Id.
(quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 413 (1988)).
38. FED. R. EvID. 412(a).
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best evidence available to a defendant in a particular instance is
reputation or opinion evidence. Should such an offer otherwise
survive the hearsay rules, the absolute ban of reputation evidence
may, in that instance, be unconstitutional as a violation of the due
process right to present evidence in one's defense and to a fair
trial.
In the Doe39 case, a Fourth Circuit case, the complainant was
known by the defendant to have a habit of hanging around the
army barracks and the snack bar, was known to be promiscuous,
and was known to call out verbally to different soldiers who
passed by. 40 When the defendant presented his defense against a
charge of rape brought by this complainant, he wished to adduce
41
evidence of her reputation and his knowledge of her reputation.
The Doe court held that although reputation and opinion evidence
is barred by the rule, such evidence may bear on the state of
mind of the defendant in making a reasonable mistake of fact
about whether the complainant consented to sexual intercourse
with him on the particular occasion. 42 In that case, the Doe court
ruled reputation and opinion evidence ought to be admissible if
that is the evidence that was available to prove the defendant's
state of mind, an element of the crime. Recently, the Fourth
Circuit has questioned the wisdom of that reasoning. 43 I think the
Fourth Circuit was right the first time in Doe, that sometimes
reputation and opinion evidence bearing on the state of mind of
the defendant or to prove one of the other 412(b) exceptions may
be constitutionally required because so long as it is relevant, it
may be the only or best available evidence to the defense.
Federal Rule of Evidence 412(b) excludes evidence of the
complainant's prior sexual conduct except in limited instances.
Federal Rule of Evidence 412(b)(1) would allow such evidence
when the Constitution requires. 44 When does the Constitution
39. Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981).
at 47.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 45.
42. Id. at 48.
43. See United States v. Saunders, 943 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1199 (1992).
44. FED. R. EVID. 412 (b)(1).
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require evidence of the complainant's prior sexual conduct?
Whenever due process, 4 5 or the Confrontation Clause, 4 6 or the
right to testify in one's behalf, 47 the right to present evidence is
implicated. This is a very fact-specific analysis. One must
understand the relationship of the proffered evidence to the
defendant's theory of his defense in the particular case. So, let
me just talk about a couple of examples when the Constitution
has been found to require evidence of a complainant's prior
sexual conduct.
In the Bear Stops48 case, the Eighth Circuit held that evidence
of a child victim's prior sexual conduct was admissible because it
was constitutionally required to explain on an alternative basis
the evidence the government introduced that this child suffered
from child abuse syndrome, and that this child had exhibited
certain manifestations of behavior, such as bed-wetting and
aggressiveness towards other children, that were consistent with
child sexual abuse syndrome. 49 In Bear Stops, the court also held
that the Constitution required the admission of the child's prior
sexual conduct, which by the way was another rape occurring at
about the same time as the alleged offense, to explain evidence
offered by the government of blood appearing on the child's
underwear. 50
In the Begay5 1 case, the Tenth Circuit held that the child
complainant's prior sexual conduct was constitutionally
admissible to explain medical testimony that she had an enlarged

45.
46.
47.
48.

See supra note 24.
See supra note 21.
See supra note 23.
United States v. Bear Stops, 997 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1993).

49. Id. at 454. During the trial, a "social worker testified that abused
children often exhibit regressive behaviors ...

and ...

may also act out

sexually as a result of the emotional trauma caused by the abuse." Id.
50. Id. at 458. The appellate court stated that "lalbsent any proof of the
type of and the timing of the Ipriorl sexual assault ... the jury likely
concluded that the alleged bloody underwear could only be the result of sexual
abuse . . . " by the defendant. Id.
51. United States v. Begay, 937 F.2d 515 (10th Cir. 1991).
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hymen that was consistent with penetration. 52 In Stamper,53

Cardinal,5 4 and Bartlett,5 5 the respective Circuits held that a
rape complainant's prior claims of sexual abuse or rape fell
within the prohibition of Rule 412, because they were evidence
of the complainant's prior sexual conduct, and thus, the evidence

could not be introduced at trial unless constitutionally required or

otherwise within an exception of Federal Rule of Evidence 412.56
One may take issue with this. I mean, one can look at a prior
claim of sexual abuse or rape not as the complainant's sexual

conduct, but as another act of reporting an incident to someone in
authority. Of course, a prior report of sexual abuse or a rape may
be quite intertwined with prior sexual conduct, although one has
to question whether a prior instance of rape or sexual abuse
constitutes sexual conduct of the complainant or something else,

such as an act of aggression, sexual in nature, perpetrated on the
complainant, but not her own sexual conduct. And the report
made by the complainant is certainly not sexual conduct,
although the report contains evidence of her sexual attack. I do
52. Id. at 520. The court noted that "the right to defend by crossexamination showing that the conditions could have resulted from earlier
conduct with another person was crucial and protected by Rule
[412(b)(2)(A)]." Id.
53. United States v. Stamper, 766 F. Supp. 1396 (W.D.N.C. 1991), affd
sub nom. In re One Female Juvenile Victim, 959 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1992).
54. United States v. "Cardinal, 782 F.2d 34 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1161 (1986).
55. United States v. Bartlett, 794 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U. S.934 (1986).
56. See Stamper, 766 F. Supp. at 1404 (finding that the absence of
evidence regarding prior charges "would deprive the jury members of
substantial information relevant to their duty of witness credibility
assessment"); see also Bartlett, 794 F.2d at 1292 n.8 (noting that "lallthough
the district court did not explicitly find that testimony of the victim's prior
false accusation of rape would be admissible under rule 412(b)(1), it is
necessarily subsumed in the court's conclusion that Bartlett was prejudiced by
the loss of this testimony"). But see Cardinal, 782 F.2d at 36 (stating that the
primary purpose of Rule 412 is to "protect rape victims from degrading and
embarrassing disclosure of intimate details about their private lives" and that
prior claims of rape are encompassed within this (quoting 124 CONG. REC.
HI 1944 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1978) (statement of Rep. Mann))).
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not think that Rule 412 necessarily needs to be construed to
prohibit all evidence of the complainant's prior claims of rape,
but two circuits, in addressing the issue, have so held; 57 and

those are the only two circuits that have answered the question.
Should there be proof that the complainant's prior reports of rape
were falsely made, to deny this evidence might be a denial of

defendant's confrontation clause right. Therefore, this ban ought
to be examined on a case by case basis.
In the Bartlett and Cardinal cases, the prior claims of rape by
the children complainants were held not to be constitutionally

required to be admitted because the defendant had not shown that
the prior claims were false. 5 8 Therefore, they did not bear on a
motive to fabricate or a pattern of fabrication and did not bear on

the credibility of the complaining witness. 59 In the Stamper case,
however, the court held that the 412(b)(1) constitutional
exception required admission of the prior false claims of sexual

abuse because a pattern had been established, one of a girl trying
to switch homes from her mother to her father, from her father to
her mother, by making allegations of sexual abuse against the

friends of whichever parents she was living with when she
wished to leave that home. 60 So, because it established a motive
of fabrication, the Stamper court held the Constitution required
the defendant be permitted to prove these prior possibly false
57. The Fourth Circuit, in Stamper, and the Eighth Circuit, in Bartlett,
have so held; see cases cited supra note 56.
58. In Bartlett, the court held that the defendant had not carried his burden
of proving that he suffered "substantial" prejudice without testimony from a
deceased witness who would have testified that the victim made a prior false
accusation of rape against the defendant. 794 F.2d at 1292-93. In Cardinal,the
court focused on the policy behind Rule 412 and found that a thirteen year old
girl should be protected from demeaning and embarrassing events that had
taken place in her private life. 782 F.2d at 36.
59. In Bartlett, the court found that the probative evidence of the alleged
prior false accusation was very weak in that the accusation dealt with different
circumstances than the incident in question. 794 F.2d at 1292. In Cardinal,the
appellate court quoted the lower court that "'evidence of a [thirteen year old]
victim's past sexual behavior [cannot be separated] from the fact that she had
made an allegation of rape and then withdr[ew] it."' 782 F.2d at 36.
60. Stamper, 766 F. Supp. at 1400.
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claims of rape, which otherwise would be within the ban of
412.61
Federal Rule of Evidence 412(b)(2)(A) exception admits
evidence of the complainant's prior sexual conduct with persons
other than the accused in two limited instances: to prove that
someone else, or to suggest that someone else, is the source of
semen in the complainant or the source of the injury to her. 62
Let me just talk about what a couple of courts have found to
fall or not fall within this exception. An injury within this
exception does not include an enlarged hymen or a ruptured
hymen. 63 That physical state does not admit evidence of prior

sexual conduct under 412(b)(2)(A). 64 An injury within this
exception does not include an emotional injury unaccompanied by
physical symptoms. 65 The term "injury" has also been held not
to include evidence of child abuse. 66 That is why in the prior
case that we discussed, the Bear Stops case, to get such evidence
admitted to explain a child's sexual abuse and the symptoms of
61. Id. The court reasoned that:
Defendant's substantial interest in presenting an adequate defense,
predicated on the concept of complainant's motive or scheme, against
the very real possibility of an extended loss of liberty, Defendant's sixth
amendment right to confront witnesses against him, and the general
constitutional importance of effective cross-examination outweighs the
possibility of embarrassment complainant might suffer upon the
revelation of her prior allegations of sexual abuse ....
Id. at 1404.
62. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(A).
63. See United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1987). In Sha,, the
court held inadmissible evidence that the condition of complainant's hymen
was caused by someone other than the defendant to rebut the government's
evidence that the condition of complainant's hymen was consistent with her
engaging in sexual intercourse. Id. at 605. The court found that although the
complainant's hymen was widened and stretched, the complainant did not
sustain an injury that would be covered under Rule 412's injury exception
because there was no evidence of tears, cuts, scratches, bruises or blood. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 603 n.2 (stating that "it is clear that Rule 412's injury exception
does not apply to emotional injuries unaccompanied by a cognizable physical
consequence").
66. Id.
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sex abuse syndrome required us to turn to the constitutional
exception. 67 Lacerations in the vagina, or tears or bruises that
are not recent, have been held not to be within the injury
exception. 68 The injury exception embraces only relevant recent
sexual conduct which may have been the cause of the tears or the
lacerations which are at issue in the particular case, 69 So
evidence of an old injury, an old laceration, will not satisfy the
exception so as to permit evidence to be introduced of the
complainant's other sexual conduct.
Federal Rule of Evidence 412(b)(2)(B), the consent exception,
will sometimes admit evidence of the defendant's past sexual
conduct with the victim, but only if the defendant raises the
victim's consent as a defense. 70 Where consent is not a defense,
this exception does not admit such evidence. So, for example, in
a statutory rape case where consent is irrelevant, of course, I do
not know why the defendant would want to admit this evidence;
it would not be admissible under the (b)(2)(B) exception.
Under 412(c), which specifies the notice and hearing
requirements, a failure to follow the dictates of the notice
requirements has been held in several cases to justify preclusion
of proffered evidence. 7 1 However, no case has yet so ruled
67. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
68. See Shaw, 824 F.2d at 608. "ITlhe 'injury' exception allows a court to

deviate from Rule 412's general rule only when the evidence establishes an
injury - such as a cut, bruise, or tear - that was sustained reasonably close in
time to the alleged rape." Id.
69. Id.
70. FED. R. EvID. 412 (b)(2)(B).
71. See United States v. Peden, 961 F.2d 517, 521-22 (5th Cir.) (finding
that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny admissibility of
records where defendant was charged with sexual abuse of a minor because the
defendant's attorney never made a proffer of evidence under Rule 412(c)),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 392 (1992); see also United States v. Eagle Thunder,
893 F.2d 950, 954 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that the defendant "failed to file a
written notice of intent to offer the evidence [of a non-recent tear to the
complainant's hymen], as required by subdivision (c), and for this reason alone
the district court could have denied his offer of proof."); Shaw. 824 F.2d at
603 n.2 (finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
evidence of other injuries partly because the defendant's motion was untimely
under Rule 412(c)).
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exclusively on that ground. There has always also been an
alternative ruling that the evidence did not fit within one of the

412(b) exceptions for admissibility. 72 So, this specific preclusion
provision for failure to make the motion timely in advance of

trial or to serve it in the manner specified has never been tested
in the United States Supreme Court.
II. NEW YORK'S RAPE SHIELD STATUTE
Now, let us look at the constitutionality of New York Criminal
Procedure Law 60.42, 73 which embodies New York's Rape
Shield statute. It works a little differently than the federal statute.
As an overview, the New York law bans all evidence of the rape

complainant's prior sexual conduct, except in five instances.
First, on its face, it makes admissible all evidence of the
complainant's prior sexual relations with the defendant. 74
Second, prostitution convictions of the complainant occurring
within three years of the event in issue are admissible. 75 Third,
defense evidence of the complainant's other sexual conduct would
be admissible to rebut prosecution evidence that the victim did

not engage in sexual intercourse or deviant sexual intercourse. 76
72. See Eagle Thwder, 893 F.2d at 954 (stating alternate ruling that
evidence of non recent tear in hymen was not relevant to source of recent tears
and therefore inadmissible under Rule 412(b)(2)(A)); see also Shaw, 824 F.2d
at 605 (stating alternate ruling that evidence of victim's past sexual behavior
was inadmissible because the defense failed to show that there was an injury
under Rule 412(b)(2)(A)).
73. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1992).
74. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42(1). See People v. Souvenir, 83 Misc.
2d 1038, 373 N.Y.S.2d 824 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1975) (holding that the
fact that complainant and defendant knew each other and may have engaged in
sexual relations in the past would be admissible evidence).
75. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42(2); Cf. People v. Conyers, 86 Misc.
2d 754, 382 N.Y.S.2d 437 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976) (holding that where
consent was not at issue the accused was not allowed to offer evidence
regarding complainant's acts as a prostitute), affd, 63 A.D.2d 634, 405
N.Y.S.2d 409 (1st Dep't 1978).
76. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42(3). See People v. Smith, 113 A.D.2d
905, 493 N.Y.S.2d 623 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 66 N.Y.2d 922, 489
N.E.2d 782, 498 N.Y.S.2d 1037 (1985). In Smith, the appellate division found
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Fourth, the New York rule would admit such evidence to rebut
or explain that the defendant is not the source or cause of
pregnancy or disease or semen found in the victim. 77 And fifth,
the catchall provision, would admit evidence of the complainant's
other sexual conduct whenever it is relevant and admissible in the
interest of justice. 78 The catchall exception does not require a
court to construe the constitution to determine whether the
constitution requires the admission of the evidence each time one
of the other enumerated exceptions is inapplicable because
serving the interest of justice is a sufficient ground for admitting
the evidence.
Now, there are five chief differences that I want to point out to
you between the federal and New York rape shield laws. First of
all, New York does not ban reputation and opinion evidence. 7 9 If
evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct is admissible, this
particular form of the evidence is not automatically banned by the
statute.

80

Second, New York fails to have any notice or hearing
requirement for the first four exceptions.81 Only the fifth
exception, the catchall exception, requires a defendant to make a

no error on the part of the trial court in limiting the defense counsel's
questioning of the complainant, a lesbian who claimed she never participated in
heterosexual conduct, to inquiries regarding her heterosexual experiences. Id.
77. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42(4). See People v. Labenski, 134
A.D.2d 907, 521 N.Y.S.2d 608 (4th Dep't 1987). The court in Labenski held
that the trial court should have permitted questioning about rape victim's prior
sexual conduct with her boyfriend where the court admitted evidence of semen
found on victim's panties. Id.
78. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42(5). See People v. Williams, 81
N.Y.2d 303, 311, 614 N.E.2d 730, 733, 598 N.Y.S.2d 167, 170 (1993)
(noting that section 60.42(5) is a provision that is designed to further the
"interest of justice" over which the trial court has discretion); People v.
Westfall, 95 A.D.2d 581, 469 N.Y.S.2d 162 (3d Dep't 1983) (affirming the
lower court's refusal to permit cross-examination of the defendant concerning
sexual relations with the father of the defendant because the father was not the
accused).
79. See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42, supra note 2.
80. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42.
81. See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42, supra note 2.
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proffer outside the hearing of the jury. 82 The proffer could occur
right in the middle of a trial, and the court may conduct such
hearing as it sees fit before it gives its ruling with an explanation
of its findings of fact. So, there is no notice or hearing
requirement except for the fifth exception and these requirements
are weaker than in the federal rule.
The New York statute is both broader and narrower in what it
would admit on its face. The federal statute does not seem to
allow for prostitution convictions whatsoever. 83 On the other
hand, the federal statute allows the defendant to prove that he is
not the source of semen wherever it is found. 84 It could be found
on the complainant's clothing, on sheets, or elsewhere and the
federal rule exception would apply. Under the New York statute,
the exception applies only where the defendant seeks to deny he
is the source of semen found in the victim. 8 5 If the source of
semen is found on the victim's clothes or on bed sheets, the
semen exception, under the New York Rape Shield Law, does
not require its admission. Of course, one could go to the catchall
exception and argue there that the interest of justice would
require the admission of the evidence as an alternative
86
explanation for the semen found.
Fourth, in New York the victim is not served with a defense
motion or proffer of the evidence of her other sexual activity
sought to be introduced, she has no notice beforehand of the
defendant's wish to introduce evidence of her prior sexual
conduct, and she cannot appeal a ruling admitting such
88
evidence. 87 She has no standing to appeal an adverse ruling.
And fifth, unlike the federal rule, New York does not construe
a complainant's prior claims of rape to be sexual conduct within
82. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42(5).
83. See generally FED. R. EVID. 412, supra note 1. Perhaps some

prostitution convictions would be admissible if the constitution required their
admissibility. See supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
84. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(A).
85. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42(4).
86. N.Y. CRmi. PROC. LAW § 60.42(5).
87. See generally N.Y. CGRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42, supra note 2.
88. See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42, supra note 2.
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the ban of its Rape Shield law. 89 Now, that does not mean that
prior claims of rape are automatically admitted. They must still
pass a threshold relevance test to see whether or not they bear in
some relevant way on the defendant's theory of his case. 90
So, those are the five chief differences. And if time permits, let
me just talk about one or two illustrative cases under each of the
sections.
Section 60.42(1), which on its face admits evidence of all prior
sexual conduct with the defendant has been limited in the
Westfal19t case to those instances where the defendant's defense
is consent. Section 60.42(2), which on its face admits all prior
prostitution convictions of the complainant that have occurred
92
within three years has similarly been limited. In the Conyers
case, the court limited the admissibility of prostitution
convictions to those instances where the defendant's defense is
consent. The third New York exception, 60.42(3), which allows
rebutted evidence about the complainant's sexual conduct, was
held in one case to allow a defendant, where the complainant
testified that she did not give consent because, in fact, she was a
lesbian, to prove that at a certain point four or five years remote
she had been heterosexual and had engaged in heterosexual
93
contact.

89. See People v. Harris, 132 A.D.2d 940, 518 N.Y.S.2d 269 (4th Dep't
1987) (allowing evidence that the victim had made two prior claims of rape
within one year of the alleged rape).
90. See People v. Mandel, 48 N.Y.2d 952, 953, 401 N.E.2d 185, 187,

425 N.Y.S.2d 63, 64 (1979) (refusing to admit evidence of past complaints by
the victim due to the lack of a "significant probative relation" between those
past charges and the current complaint facing the defendant), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 949 (1980).
91. People v. Westfall, 95 A.D.2d 581, 583, 469 N.Y.S.2d 162, 164 (3d
Dep't 1983) ("ITlhe relevance of the victim's previous sexual conduct with the
accused will generally bear on the issue of consent .... ).
92. People v. Conyers, 86 Misc. 2d 754, 382 N.Y.S.2d 437 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1976), aff'd, 63 A.D.2d 634, 405 N.Y.S.2d 409 (lst Dep't
1978).
93. See People v. Smith, 192 A.D.2d 806, 596 N.Y.S.2d 539 (3d Dep't
1993), supra note 76.
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Now, there is a general catch-all provision in both statutes 94
and this is where the most discussion occurs. So let me just talk
about a couple of cases which illustrate when the catch-all
exception has been held to admit evidence.
In the Mande195 case, the New York Court of Appeals ruled
that evidence of the complainant's prior sexual conduct was
admissible because the interests of justice so required. In that
case, the defendant's theory was that the complainant fabricated
her charge of rape. This was, according to the defendants, an
instance of consensual group sex until, during the sexual act,
water balloons fell out of the complainant's bra, which caused the
defendants to burst out laughing, which in turn allegedly enraged
the woman. 96 The defense claimed that this turn of events
provided her with a motive to fabricate the rape charges, and
given that theory, the court ruled the constitutional exception
required evidence that on other prior occasions of the
complainant's sexual conduct, when it would have been natural
for the woman to permit someone to touch her breasts, she had
not permitted such action. 97 Additionally, it allowed evidence
98
that she appeared to have unusually large breasts.
The Latzer 99 case involved sexual acts allegedly committed on
minor boys. In the Latzer case, Judge Glasser granted a writ of
habeas corpus to require evidence that the minor boy
complainants had engaged in other acts of deviant sexual
intercourse, with numerous other men, at the particular location

94. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42(5).
95. People v. Mandel, 48 N.Y.2d 952, 401 N.E.2d 185, 425 N.Y.S.2d 63

(1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 949 (1980).
96. People v. Mandel, 61 A.D.2d 563, 569, 403 N.Y.S.2d 63, 68 (2d
Dep't 1978), rev'd, 48 N.Y.2d 952, 401 N.E.2d 185, 425 N.Y.S.2d 63
(1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 949 (1980).
97. Id.

98. Id. at 574, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 71. An 18-year old student who had
sexual relations with the complainant alleged in an affidavit that the
"complainant had never permitted him to touch her exceptionally large
breasts." Id.
99. Latzer v. Abrams, 602 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
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where the incident in question occurred. 1 00 The defense theory
was one of mistaken identity. Furthermore, there was enough
discrepancy in the boys' identification testimony that Judge

Glasser thought it was relevant for the jury to know that the
complainants had numerous instances of sexual contact with other
men, all of which were rather brief. This evidence related to
identification, an issue in the case, and supported the theory of
mistaken identity. 10 1

One New York Court of Appeals case which did not require
the evidence of the complainant's prior sexual conduct was the
Williams102 case. In Williams, the New York Court of Appeals,
for the first time, upheld the constitutionality of the Rape Shield
statute. 10 3 In that case, a woman claimed that she had been raped

100. Id. Judge Glasser found that the "petitioner's confrontational rights
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when the
cross-examination of two key witnesses was unduly restricted." Id. at 1315.
101. Id. at 1316. One brother testified that Bob Fox, the man with whom
they had sexual contact, was 5'5" tall, and at trial, the defendant "was
measured at 5'9 1/2" without shoes and 5'10 3/4" with shoes." id. A second
discrepancy was that another brother described Bob Fox as having gray hair,
and the defendant had dirty blond hair. Id. A third discrepancy was that
Matthew stated to police that he first met Bob Fox on July 4, 1981, six months
after the date of the alleged crime. Id. The court stated that "[p]etitioner had
thus established a sufficient foundation for his defense of mistaken
identification to justify cross-examination of the brothers regarding their sexual
history for purposes of further supporting that defense." Id. at 1320.
102. People v. Williams, 81 N.Y.2d 303, 614 N.E.2d 730, 598 N.Y.S.2d
167 (1993).
103. Id. "The constitutional standard is one of arbitrariness." Id. at 315, 81
N.E.2d at 735, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 172 see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42(5)
(McKinney 1992) (providing that a trial court is only required to hear an "offer
of proof by the accused" and provide a "statement ...

of its findings of

fact"). In Williams, the defense was given two opportunities to discuss the
evidence and demonstrate its relevance. 81 N.Y.2d at 314, 614 N.E.2d at 735,
598 N.Y.S.2d at 172. The court then gave a statement of its findings and ruled
that the evidence was inadmissible. Id. The trial court's denial of this evidence
was not arbitrary. Id. at 315, 614 N.E.2d at 735, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
Therefore, the defendants' federal constitutional due process rights, and rights
to confront witnesses, were not violated. Id. at 312, 614 N.E.2d at 733, 598
N.Y.S.2d at 170.
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by a number of black men; the complainant was white. 104 The
defendants wanted to offer evidence of other instances of group
sex between the complainant and black men, allegedly to explain
her motive to testify against these defendants. 105 That was the
proffer, in its entirety, of the defense theory of the relevance of
the evidence of the complainant's other sexual conduct. The New
York Court of Appeals ruled this was an illogical proffer. 106 The
court ruled the proffer did not bear on, or explain at all, a motive
to fabricate charges - it did not explain at all a motive to have
brought this action that would make us suspect the charge of rape
was false. 10 7 And so in that case, because the proffer did not
pass a threshold test of relevance, the interests of justice did not
require admission of that other conduct. Some might argue that
10 8
this evidence was somewhat relevant to the issue of consent.
But this is the type of reasoning the statute was specifically
104. Williams, 81 N.Y.2d at 311, 614 N.E.2d at 733, 598 N.Y.S.2d at
170.
105. Id. at 315, 614 N.E.2d at 735, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 172; see N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAWv § 60.42(5) (barring evidence of a victim's past sexual conduct
unless such evidence is found by the court to be "relevant and admissible in the
interests of justice").
106. Williams, 81 N.Y.2d at 315, 614 N.E.2d at 735, 598 N.Y.S.2d at
172. "Though given a full opportunity to do so, counsel made no effort to
explain how prior sexual conduct with other males would be probative of the
complainant's motive to testify - a connection neither apparent nor logical on
its face." Id.
107. Id. at 315, 614 N.E.2d at 735, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 172. The defense
counsel gave no explanation as to how the evidence, that the rape victim had
previously engaged in group sex, was probative of the victim's motive to
testify, and did not "suggest that the evidence might be relevant to the question
of consent. .

.

. " Id.

108. Id. As an alternate theory, the defendants alleged that they erroneously
believed that the victim had consented to this sexual conduct. Id. at 316, 614
N.E.2d at 736, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 173. Therefore, they alleged that "their
mistaken belief negated the intent necessary for a finding of guilt on the
various counts." Id. However, the New York Court of Appeals stated that "it
is unnecessary to forcibly compel another to engage in sexual acts unless that
person is an unwilling participant. Thus, the jury, by finding that defendants
used forcible compulsion to coerce the victim to engage in sodomy and
intercourse, necessarily found that defendants believed the victim did not
consent. . . ." Id. at 317, 614 N.E.2d at 736-37, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 173-74.
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designed to foreclose. The purpose of the Rape Shield laws is a
legislative determination that prior consent on other occasions to
have sex, with other people, whether it be group sex, whether it
be interracial, whatever it may be, is irrelevant to the question of
consent in the particular instance on trial. 10 9
CONCLUSION

Let me just leave you with two of my own thoughts. If I were
administering changes to Federal Rule of Evidence 412,110 I
would recommend changing the catch-all exception to be similar
to the New York statute so that we could avoid a constitutional
analysis in every instance. As it now stands, the rule requires
courts to determine whether or not confrontation rights and other
important criminal constitutional rights are violated if the
evidence is foreclosed. I think the New York approach of
determining whether or not the interests of justice require the
admission would probably admit not that much more evidence of
sexual history, yet has the virtue of avoiding frequent
constitutional analysis.
Secondly, if I were to urge the New York legislature to do
something, it would be to adopt notice requirements. Notice
requirements would serve the interests of the legislature in
enacting the Rape Shield law: to avoid unfair surprise and
harassment of the victim; to avoid unfair surprise to the
prosecution; and to give the court a thorough basis for evaluating
the admissibility of the evidence. Thank you.

109. Id. at 312, 614 N.E.2d at 733, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 170. The purpose of

the Rape Shield law is to protect the victim from harassment and to not
confuse the jurors. Id. The victim's past "unchastity" is not probative of
current consent and is "of little or no relevance and may seriously prejudice
the prosecution of sex crimes." Id.

110. See infra notes 111-32 and accompanying text for proposed changes to
Federal Rule of Evidence 412 which become effective December 1, 1994,
unless Congress takes action to the contrary.
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Following the Symposium, on April 8, 1994, the United States
Supreme
Evidence
Congress
Evidence

Court proposed significant changes to Federal Rule of
412. The changes take effect December 1, 1994, unless
takes action to the contrary. Proposed Federal Rule of
412,111 the rape shield rule, would be extended to

apply in all criminal cases. 112 It would no longer be confined to
those instances where the defendant was charged with rape or

111. FED. R. EvID. 412 (proposed). The proposed rule provides:
(a) Evidence Generally Inadmissible. The following evidence is not
admissible in any criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual
misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other
sexual behavior; and
(2) evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if otherwise
admissible under these rules:
(1) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged
victim offered to prove that a person other than the accused was
the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence;
(2) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged
victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct
offered by the accused to prove consent or by the prosecution; and
(3) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional
rights of the defendant.
(c) Procedure to Determine Admissibility.
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision (b) must:
(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial specifically
describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it
is offered unless the court, for good cause requires a
different time for filing or permits filing during trial; and
(B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged victim or,
when appropriate, the alleged victim's guardian or
representative.
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must conduct a
hearing in camera and afford the victim and parties a right to
attend and be heard. The motion, related papers, and the record of
the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal unless the court
orders otherwise.
Id.
112. See FED. R. EvID. 412(a) (proposed).
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another sex offense. 113 Hence, it is no longer just a "rape
shield," and such a name is a misnomer. Proposed Federal Rule
of Evidence 412 would bar evidence of the alleged victim's
"other sexual behavior" as well as evidence offered to prove the
alleged victim's "sexual predisposition."
The proposed rule as submitted to Congress deleted, at the
eleventh hour, a provision that would have extended application
of the rule to all civil cases. 114 Indeed, the deletion appears to
have occurred so late that the currently available legislative
history accompanying this proposed rule describes the
amendment as it applies to civil cases. 115 One can only speculate
that, despite its omission from the current version of the
proposed rule, extending the rule's nearly absolute ban on
evidence of a victim's "other sexual behavior" and "sexual
predisposition" to civil cases is still under serious consideration
by the Committee.
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 412 works broad changes.
The extension of the shield law's exclusionary rule from sex
offenses to all criminal offenses is sound. 116 There is no strong
113. FED. R. EVID. 412(a) (proposed). The present rule only applies "in a
criminal case in which a person is accused of an offense under chapter 109A of
title 18, United States Code."
114. The Honorable Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, by letter dated
April 29, 1994, wrote to the Honorable John F. Gerry, Chair, Executive
Committee of the Judicial Conference, that approval has been withheld
of that portion of the proposed amendments to Rule of Evidence 412
which would apply that Rule to civil cases, and make evidence of the
sexual behavior or predisposition ...

admissible only if "its probative

value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of
unfair prejudice to any party."
Letter from Honorable Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Honorable John
F. Gerry (April 29, 1994) in H.R. Doc. 250, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
115. The committee note accompanying the published proposed amendment
to Federal Rule of Evidence 412 incorrectly states "Rule 412 applies to both
civil and criminal proceedings." The committee note also indicates that Rule
412's amendment was intended to "apply in a Title VII action in which the
plaintiff has alleged sexual harassment." FED. R. EvID. 412 advisory
committee's note (proposed). But see infra note 120.
116. The committee notes indicate that the revised rule "applies in all cases
involving sexual misconduct without regard to whether the alleged victim or

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss1/8

26

Bartel: Rape Shield Statutes

1994]

RAPE SHIELD STATUTES

policy reason requiring the sexual activities of a victim of a crime
to be admitted in evidence at a criminal trial, except in the few
circumstances the statute provides. Extending the ban on
evidence of an alleged victim's sexual activities to include all
criminal proceedings, not just rape trials, would close a gap in
the law that has continued contrary to the underlying purposes of
Federal Rule of Evidence 412. The purposes of the revised rule
as summarized by the committee are to "diminish some of the
confusion engendered by the original rule and to expand the
protection afforded alleged victims of sexual misconduct." 1 17
The rule further aims to protect the alleged victim against
"invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual
stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate
sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the
factfinding process." 118 The rule is also intended, by protecting
victims, to encourage "victims of sexual misconduct to institute
and participate in legal proceedings against alleged offenders." 119
There is no compelling reason to allow evidence of an alleged
victim's sexual experience into evidence in criminal trials,
charging crimes other than a sex offense, when such evidence is
barred, except in limited circumstances, from trials charging a
sex offense. Indeed, there ought be fewer instances when an
alleged victim's sexual experience could be relevant or
constitutionally required where the crime charged against the
accused is not a sex offense. This proposed amendment makes
sense and is overdue. It is also consistent with Congress' goal to
eliminate barriers that cause victims of crime to under report
crime or refuse to testify.
Let me give an example of when this change would matter.
Suppose someone kidnaps a victim for the purpose of committing
rape, but does not succeed far enough in his acts to attempt or
person accused is a party to the litigation. ..[and to] 'pattern'
witnesses. . . whose testimony about other instances of sexual misconduct by
the person accused is otherwise admissible." FED. R. EvID. 412 advisory

committee's note (proposed).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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commit rape. He could be charged criminally only with
kidnapping, which is not a sex offense and, thus, not restricted
by Federal Rule of Evidence 412. At trial, under the rule as
currently written, the defense is free to offer evidence of the
victim's alleged sexual activities with others so long as that
evidence is otherwise admissible under the rules and he might use
this evidence to argue he did not kidnap the victim, but rather
that she voluntarily accompanied him for the purpose of having
sex. Introduction of the evidence of sexual history is inconsistent
with Congress' judgment that a victim's sexual activity with other
persons on other occasions is generally irrelevant to the question
of the victim's consent to the event charged. Of course, the
defense is free to argue the alleged victim voluntarily
accompanied him for the purpose of consensual sex, but without
introducing evidence of the victim's prior sexual experience.
Congress has already determined such evidence should be
admissible only in the limited exceptions and for the limited
purposes recognized by the shield statute. Yet because
kidnapping, not rape, was charged, Rule 412's ban did not apply.
On the other hand, not extending the prohibition of proposed
Federal Rule of Evidence 412, as written, to civil cases seems the
sounder course at present. 120 A different rule may well be
appropriate in civil trials. There is a strong public interest in
encouraging victims to report crime and testify which is impeded
when the victim fears inquiry, occurring at a public criminal
trial, into the details of her personal life. Since criminal
proceedings limit pre-trial discovery, in the absence of the
120. Minutes of the Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules
on May 6-7, 1993 (discussing FED. R. EVID. 412 (proposed)). Michael A.

Cooper, Esq., appearing as Chair of the American College of Trial Lawyers'
Ihereinafter ACTL Federal Rules of Evidence Committee, stated that the
"ACTL Committee considers it good sense to extend Rule 412 to all criminal
cases, but has some reservations about extending the rule to all civil cases,

particularly employment discrimination cases under Title VII." Id. However,
Michael Chepiga, Esq., testifying on behalf of the Federal Courts Committee

of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, advocated an
"'essential issue' test for civil cases rather than the proposed alternative
balancing test ......
Id. Mr. Chepiga favors an extensioi of Rule 412 to civil
matters.
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protection of the rape shield statute, victims lack advance notice
and have to expect the worst humiliation by the defense in its
attempt to discredit the witness. This inhibits the filing of
criminal charges.
Of course there is also a public interest in encouraging
meritorious civil lawsuits to remedy private wrongs. The public
interest differs, however, in several ways. In a civil case, the fear
of public exposure of one's intimate activities may not as
frequently deter the bringing of charges. For one thing, there is
an incentive to bring a civil suit that does not exist in the filing of
a criminal complaint - the hope or expectation of the private
recovery of damages. In civil cases, there also may not be
someone whose position is akin to that of the "victim" in
criminal cases - and the rule only precludes evidence of a
"victim's" sexual experience, a term the interpretation of which
has to be stretched before it readily applies in civil matters.
Evidence of an alleged victim's "sexually provocative speech or
dress" may also sometimes be relevant in employment
12 1
harassment cases or other civil sexual harassment cases.
Perhaps more importantly, the rules of discovery in civil cases,
unlike criminal proceedings, already afford substantial protection
against surprise at trial, undue harassment of a witness or party,
and ample means to prevent an adversary's probing into
irrelevant personal matters.
In civil cases, federal judges have the power, under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), 12 2 to grant protective orders. Such

121. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986).
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). This rule provides:

Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, accompanied by a certification that the movant has
in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties
in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action, and for good
cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively,
on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the
deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice requires to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:
(1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had;
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an order can determine that the area of inquiry is irrelevant and
therefore, should be foreclosed. 12 3 Alternatively, the protective
order may determine the area of inquiry is relevant, in which

case, questioning is appropriate. Even in such instance, however,
the court has the ability to protect the privacy interest of the civil
litigant by sealing the deposition or other pretrial evidence
gathering device. 124 Further, the court can limit access to the
sealed record to those few persons who require access to the
information for the purpose of the civil litigation, restricting use

of the information to the purposes of the litigation and prohibiting
anyone with access to the information from any further use or
dissemination of the information in any form. 125 By invoking
(2) that the disclosure or discovery may be had only on specified terms
and conditions, including a designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other
than that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the
disclosure or discovery be limited to certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons
designated by the court;
(6) that a deposition, after being sealed, be opened only by order of the
court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a
designated way; and
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or
information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed
by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the
court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party
or other person provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule
37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the
motion.
Id.
123. Id.
124. See Nault's Auto. Sales, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Acura Auto. Div., 148 F.R.D. 25 (D. N.H. 1993) (stating that judge must
consider the important constitutional and common law interests in public access
to judicial records as well as the interests of the litigants); American Securit
Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 20 F.R.D. 196 (D. Del. 1957) (noting that
the entry of an order of secrecy is discretionary with the court).
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these measures, harassment and embarrassment from unfair
pretrial discovery into a civil litigant's or a witness' sexual
activities should be curtailed substantially, if not eliminated
completely. Thus, the tools exist in the civil context to prevent
abusive inquiry and harassment.
Because of pretrial civil discovery, there ought be no surprise
at a civil trial. 126 A party can move to preclude his adversary's
evidence and the court, being already apprised of the potential
evidence, is in a position to determine its relevance and rule on
its admissibility before the line of questioning of witnesses is
offered.
The court will admit the evidence only where it satisfies the
requirements of relevance 12 7 such that its probative value is not
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or confusion of
issues. 128 Thus, the goals of the rape shield statute - to avoid
prejudice, to minimize the introduction of confusing material and
to eliminate harassment of witnesses - are goals already subject
to substantial accomplishment in the civil proceeding without
resort to Federal Rule of Evidence 412.
There is perhaps a further reason why proposed Federal Rule
of Evidence 412 as written ought not be extended to civil
matters. The few limited exceptions it would recognize - when
the constitutional rights of the defendant 1 29 would otherwise be

125. See Carr v. Monroe Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.

denied, Aldridge v. Carr, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971) (stating that the trial court is
bound by public policy to limit the availability and use of protected
documents); cf. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 431 (N.D.
I11.1976) (noting that protective order was limited to defendant's means of

gathering information).
126. See Burke v. Fire Underwriters Ass'n, 21 F.R.D. 583 (W.D. Mo.
1958) (stating Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be employed to

eliminate surprise and allow parties to obtain sufficient information for trial);
New England Terminal Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Corp., 1 F.R.D. 411
(D.C. Cir. 1940) (finding that an object of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure was to demand simplicity and avoid surprise).
127. FED. R. EvID. 401.
128. FED. R. EvID. 403.
129. FED. R. EvID. 412 (b)(1) (proposed).
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violated, when consent 130 is an issue, or to prove someone else is
responsible for the source of semen, injury or physical
evidence 1 31 -- are geared to criminal cases. These several
exceptions as written do not contemplate the myriad of civil
actions that have no criminal counterpart, but where sexual
experience might be relevant.
Until someone examines the scope of exceptions that would be
just in the civil context because of the relevance of the evidence,
it would enact an unsound blanket prohibition against such
evidence. The ban of the evidence required by Federal Rule of
Evidence 412 needs to be refined to consider its full impact on
civil cases before it should be extended to apply in civil trials.
Not extending the total ban of Federal Rule of Evidence 412 to
civil matters until exceptions that consider when such evidence
may be appropriately admitted in civil trials should not work any
unfairness or injustice to parties or witnesses or the outcome of
proceedings. Congress' goals in enacting Federal Rule of
Evidence 412 are already largely, if not completely, capable of
being accomplished under the existing Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Rules of Evidence.
Another significant revision embodied in proposed Federal
Rule of Evidence 412 is the ban on evidence regarding an alleged
victim's "sexual predisposition." This term is not defined in the
statute and will require judicial construction. A dictionary
definition defines predisposition as the "condition of being
predisposed: inclination, tendency less than habits ....1132 By
this term, Congress may be attempting to foreclose any evidence
that an alleged victim has a tendency or proclivity to agree to or
engage in sexual activity or to refuse to agree to sexual activity.
But the term could encompass more, such as precluding evidence
that an alleged victim prefers or disdains particular types of
sexual activity, such as group sex, homosexual activity,
interracial sex, or other more specific types of sexual acts.
Congress' judgment appears to be that a person's having engaged
130. FED. R. EvID. 412 (b)(2)(B) (proposed).
131. FED. R. EVID. 412 (b)(2)(A) (proposed).
132. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1981).
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in a particular type of sexual activity before, even to an extent
that reaches the level of a "sexual predisposition," is nonetheless,
with few exceptions, irrelevant to the determination of what
happened during the specific event complained about in the
criminal case. This judgment is sound and consistent with
Congress' goal of seeking to eliminate prejudicial and confusing
evidence from criminal trials and avoiding harassment of alleged
victims.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Thank you, Professor Bartel. One thing that you pointed out
would just illustrate what was brought up this morning; it really
contradicts a fear that was brought up this morning in connection
with codification -- the fear that if the rules are codified, it will
tend to operate as a straitjacket. This does not seem to have
happened in New York. The rule with respect to the use of the
prostitution convictions - the courts had no hesitancy in
overlaying a limitation that it be where consent is a defense.
Probably the people who are most concerned with the fairness of
the operation of rules of evidence are judges, because they sit and
their job is to try to see that at least there has been a fair trial.
And judges, more than anyone else, see the detailed everyday
operation of rules of evidence over a series of cases. They have
an instinct for what is necessary in order to keep the scales of
justice in balance. I have great faith, as I do in juries, in judges
to handle the rules of evidence no matter what the codifiers say.
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